The European human rights influence upon UK extradition: myth debunked. by Arnell, Paul
 
 
 
 
OpenAIR@RGU 
 
The Open Access Institutional Repository 
at Robert Gordon University 
 
http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
This is an author produced version of a paper published in  
 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (ISSN 0928-
9569, eISSN 1571-8174) 
 
This version may not include final proof corrections and does not include 
published layout or pagination. 
 
 
Citation Details 
 
Citation for the version of the work held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’: 
 
ARNELL, P., 2013. The European Human Rights influence upon UK 
extradition – myth debunked. Available from OpenAIR@RGU. 
[online]. Available from: http://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
 
ARNELL, P., 2013. The European Human Rights influence upon UK 
extradition – myth debunked. European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice, 21 (3-4), pp. 317-337. 
 
 
 
Copyright 
Items in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’, Robert Gordon University Open Access Institutional Repository, 
are protected by copyright and intellectual property law. If you believe that any material 
held in ‘OpenAIR@RGU’ infringes copyright, please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with 
details. The item will be removed from the repository while the claim is investigated. 
The European Human Rights Influence upon UK Extradition - Myth Debunked  
Dr Paul Arnell 
Law School, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, United Kingdom  
 
Introduction 
 
Within the United Kingdom the perception exists that human rights law emanating 
from Europe hinders extradition. This notion is fostered and held by the segments of 
the press and various politicians. For example, following a decision in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) discussed below, it was written in the UK’s Daily 
Mail “It is not only the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, Theresa May, who 
are exasperated and frustrated… It is also, for want of a better description, the man on 
the Clapham omnibus who wonders how the twisted minds of these judges reach such 
rulings which have been on so many occasions just plain bonkers”.1 The belief that 
European human rights law frustrates extradition is almost entirely fallacious, and, 
disturbingly, it acts to mask significant features and distinctions within the legal 
regimes protecting human rights affecting extradition within Europe. This article will 
explain the germane UK and European law in the area of extradition generally and 
with reference to two recent authorities, Ahmad v United Kingdom
2
 decided by the 
ECtHR and Re Request for Preliminary Ruling in the case of Ciprian Vasile Radu
3
 
decided under EU law. These two authorities are discussed because they highlight the 
limited practical effect of human rights upon extradition in the European context. For 
example, mandatory life sentences without a possibility of parole and objectively 
severe conditions of detention have not acted to prevent extradition. Through a critical 
explanation of the law and these recent authorities it will be established that the 
popular conception that European human rights law acts to the detriment of 
extradition and international criminal justice is misplaced. In addition to this central 
conclusion, this article will make two related secondary points – one specific to EU 
law and one to Convention jurisprudence. Firstly, it will be seen that the EU’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Charter) does not materially impact upon the 
operation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) at present (it may, however, do so 
in the future). Secondly, in regard to Convention-related jurisprudence, a relativist 
approach in the application of fundamental human rights in an extradition context will 
be demonstrated – in spite of explicit pronouncement to the contrary – lessening the 
impact of human rights upon extradition in certain cases. 
 
United Kingdom Extradition Law
4
 
                                       
1
 Moncrieff, C., Abu Hamza extradition: The UK must assert its sovereignty on human rights, 
Daily Mail, 10 April 2012. The decision, ironically, rejected arguments against extradition.  
2
 (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 1. 
3
 Both the Advocate General’s Opinion in the case and the Grand Chamber (ECJ) decision 
itself are relevant. Case C-396/11, Radu, 29 January 2013, Grand Chamber, Court of Justice, 
cited at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0396:EN:HTML. The 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 18 October 2012, is cited at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CC0396:EN:HTML. 
4
 See generally A Review of Extradition, published in September 2011 (the Baker Review) 
and the Human Rights Joint Committee’s Fifteenth Report, The Human Rights Implications of 
UK Extradition Policy, published in June 2011. Leading academic sources are Jones, A. and 
 Extraditions from and to the UK are governed by the Extradition Act 2003 (the 2003 
Act). The 2003 Act has spawned considerable jurisprudence, commentary and 
criticism, largely because of the role given to human rights by it. It was passed to 
modernise and streamline the processing of extradition requests submitted to the UK.
5
 
Specifically, the 2003 Act was enacted to give effect to the recommendations in The 
Law on Extradition: A Review, March 2001
6
, and to implement the European Union’s 
Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender 
Procedures between Member States of 13 June 2002 (Framework Decision)
7
. 
 
Two sets of arrangements under the 2003 Act govern the majority of UK extradition 
cases, under Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 of the 2003 Act relates to surrender of persons to 
Category 1 territories. These are the 28 territories (all EU states and Gibraltar) which 
have implemented the Framework Decision.
8
 Territories not designated Category 1 
and having regular extradition relations with the UK are designated Category 2.
9
 
There are notable differences between the requirements for rendition of persons to 
each group. Requests from Category 2 territories must include prima facie evidence 
of guilt, under section 84 of the 2003 Act – unlike requests from Category 1 
territories. That requirement can be waived, and has been for countries including 
United States.
10
 The extradition process to Category 2 states entails the involvement 
of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, also unlike Category 1. Considered 
by Ministers are the death penalty, speciality and the requested person’s earlier 
transfer from the UK. There is not, however, a general political discretion under the 
2003 Act to refuse to order an extradition. This had developed, though, under the law 
of judicial review. It was notably exercised in favour of Gary McKinnon on the basis 
of human rights.
11
 This avenue for persons subject to extradition has been closed, 
                                                                                                             
Doobay, A., Extradition and Mutual Assistance, Third Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London 
2004, and Dickson, D.J., The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Extradition, 
Reissue. There are also numerous academic articles on aspects of the subject, including 
several by the present author, including Arnell, P., Scots Extradited, [2008] Juridical Review 
241, Arnell, P., The Law of Extradition, (2012) 3 Scots Law Times 13, and Arnell, P., The 
Law of Extradition - the Response to the Baker Review, (2012) 40 Scots Law Times 251 and 
by other authors Dugard, J., and Van Den Wyngaert, C., Applying the European Convention 
on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, (1990) 39 ICLQ 757. 
5
 Baker Review, supra note 4, at page 23. 
6
 The 2001 Review is found on the National Archive’s website, at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071204153757/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/d
ocuments/extradition-law-080601?version=1.  
7
 2002/584/JHA. 
8
 Designated as such by SI 2003/3333, SI 2004/1898, SI 2005/365, SI 2005/2036 and SI 
2013/1583. See further Mackeral, M., 'Surrendering' the Fugitive—The European Arrest 
Warrant and the United Kingdom, (2007) 71 Journal of Criminal Law 362. 
9
 These are states who are party to the European Convention on Extradition 1957, members of 
the London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth or party to a bilateral 
extradition treaty with the United Kingdom.  
10
 Under s 84(7) of the 2003 Act. This has been done by s 3(2) of SI 2003/3334. 
11
 McKinnon’s was the first case in which this right was recognised, in McKinnon v 
Government of the United States of America [2005] EWHC 762 (Admin). 
following the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
12
 In regard to the rendition of persons to 
both Category 1 and Category 2 territories the extradition judge
13
 must consider 
several possible bars to extradition including human rights. 
 
Sections 21 and 87 of the 2003 Act oblige judicial consideration of human rights 
within the extradition process in regard to Category 1 and 2 respectively. Human 
rights are a possible bar to extradition, as are double jeopardy and the passage of time. 
Section 21(1) provides “If the judge is required to proceed under this section… he 
must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with Convention 
rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998”. Section 87(1) applies 
similarly to extraditions to Category 2 territories. It is under these sections that the 
vast majority of human rights questions have come to be considered in UK courts. 
From an intra-UK perspective, then, sections 21 and 87, together with section 6 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 have brought human rights to extradition proceedings.
14
  
 
It is the precise manner in which human rights apply in the UK that leads to the 
particular relevance of the Convention, and indeed the Charter. The Human Rights 
Act 1998 gives effect to “Convention rights”. Specifically it obliges all public 
authorities, including courts, to act compatibly with them. Further, there is a 
requirement upon UK courts to take into account, inter alia, judgements of the 
ECtHR in coming to their decisions under section 2. The system of individual petition 
also remains, allowing individuals in certain circumstances to take a case to 
Strasbourg. The UK’s obligation under international law to abide by the terms of the 
Convention, and to adhere to decisions of the ECtHR to which it is a party under 
article 46 also, obviously, continue. Therefore, the law as developed by the ECtHR, 
and indeed the Convention itself, has great relevance for and within the UK – and this 
fact in itself may explain some of the antipathy felt towards “European human rights”. 
In the context of extradition, European human rights have been relevant since 1989, 
the year of the landmark ECtHR case of Soering v UK.
15
 This was the first time that 
the ECtHR held that a state party’s responsibility could be engaged through an 
extradition.
16
 European human rights-related involvement in extradition therefore 
                                       
12
 Part 2 of Schedule 20 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 inserted subsection 11 into section 
70 of the 2003 Act, which prevents the Secretary of State’s consideration of human rights in 
Category 2 cases. 
13
 Sections 67(1) and 139(1) define the ‘appropriate judge’ for Category 1 and 2 respectively, 
this is, in England and Wales, a District Judge designated for the purpose in Scotland, the 
Sheriff of Lothian and Borders, and in Northern Ireland a county court judge or resident 
magistrate so designated. 
14
 Section 6 obliges public authorities, including courts, to act compatibly with human rights. 
There are relatively few relevant reported cases in the period between the entry into force of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (2 October 2000) and the 2003 Act (1 January 2004). In Serbeh v 
Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] EWHC 2356 (QB), the court accepted that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 applied in the context of extradition cases.  
15
 (1989) 11 EHRR 439. The ECtHR had considered extradition-related proceedings prior to 
Soering, in the form of an application for provisional release pending an extradition hearing in 
Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland, (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 71. 
16
 Amongst a large volume of commentary see Finnie, W., Extradition and the Death Penalty, 
(1990) 7 SLT 53, Marks, D., Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the European Convention 
on Human Rights, (1990) 49(2) Cambridge Law Journal 194 and Janik C., and Kleinlein, T,. 
When Soering went to Iraq...: Problems of Jurisdiction, Extraterritorial Effect and Norm 
predates the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 2003 Act. On top of this is the relatively 
novel effect of the Charter and the related jurisprudence of the ECJ – discussed 
below.   
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Extradition 
 
The Convention entered into force in 1953, with the first judgment of the court it 
created, the ECtHR, being handed down in 1960. It was by no means certain that the 
ECHR would apply to extradition. It does not contain extradition-specific provision.
17
 
Perhaps even more significantly, the Convention is limited in its application. Article 1 
provides “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. It is not 
unreasonable to conclude that a requested person would not be protected by the 
Convention in a non-party to it. Of course that is not the case. The ECtHR has 
interpreted the Convention to apply to extradition, as indeed it has to other cases 
which are not obviously within the (territorial) jurisdiction of state parties.
18
 It has 
done so by considering possible future human rights violations in the requesting state 
– outside the territory of all Council of Europe state parties. This is not to suggest, 
though, that human rights apply to extradition only in this extraterritorial sense. There 
exist both “domestic” and “foreign” human rights cases – a distinction first made in 
UK law by Lord Bingham.
19
 Domestic cases centre upon a possible violation of 
human rights within the extraditing territory – for example on account of the 
separation from one’s family.20 A foreign case, in contrast, contains an argument that 
a human rights violation may take place in the requesting country, such as in Soering. 
 
Soering is the first ECtHR judgement to hold that a state party would violate the 
Convention if it were to extradite an individual in the face of substantial grounds for 
believing that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment. The well-known passage inter alia 
provides:  
“It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention… 
were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to another State 
where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. 
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief 
                                                                                                             
Conflicts in Light of the European Court of Human Rights' Al-Saadoon Case, (2009) 1(3) 
Gottingen Journal of International Law 459. 
17
 Article 5(1)(f) permits detention pending extradition but the Convention does provide for 
the application of human rights to a person subject to the process – in contrast to the Charter, 
noted below. 
18
 There is a considerable body of jurisprudence relating to the non-extradition related 
extraterritorial application of the Convention, and copious academic literature. The leading 
cases include Bankovic et al. v. Belgium and 16 other NATO countries, (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 
SE5, and Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18. Commentary includes 
Arnell, P, Human Rights Abroad, (2007) 16(2) Nottingham Law Journal 1, Milanovic, M., 
Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, [2012] EJIL 121 and Coomans, F. and Kamminga, M., 
(eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2004. 
19
 In Regina (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, at paras 8-9.   
20
 A leading domestic is Norris v United States [2010] UKSC 9. 
and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and 
intendment of the Article…”.21  
In the decades following Soering the ECtHR has upheld, developed and refined this 
position.
22
 
 
The history of the application of the Convention to extradition is one of substantive 
expansion, and – importantly for our present purposes - legal and practical limitation. 
Substantive expansion denotes judicial acceptance of the applicability of further 
human rights to extradition. In Soering, as noted, article 3 was held applicable. The 
ECtHR also accepted that article 6 might affect an extradition case – albeit 
exceptionally.
23
 Such an exceptional case – the first time that the ECtHR has found 
that a removal would be in violation of article 6 on account of the prospective 
proceedings abroad – is Othman v UK.24 Article 5, protecting the right to liberty and 
security of the person, was explicitly and definitively accepted as applying to removal 
cases – albeit the domestic variety - in 2009 in Garabayev v Russia.25 It was not until 
2012 that article 5 was accepted applying in a foreign removal case. This was in 
Othman where it was inter alia argued that, if deported, he would be at real risk of a 
flagrant denial of his right to liberty because of the possibility of incommunicado 
detention for up to 50 days. After noting the opacity surrounding the applicability of 
article 5 the ECtHR stated: 
“The Court also considers that it would be illogical if an applicant who faced 
imprisonment in a receiving state after a flagrantly unfair trial could rely on 
art.6 to prevent his expulsion to that state but an applicant who faced 
imprisonment without any trial whatsoever could not rely on art.5 to prevent 
his expulsion”.26 
Therefore, article 5 has clearly been accepted as applying in both domestic and 
foreign removal cases.  
 
Article 8, protecting private and family life, has been argued at the ECtHR as a basis 
for preventing an extradition or removal on a number of occasions, including Balogun 
v UK
27
 and Boultif v Switzerland.
28
 In Boultif the applicant successfully invoked 
article 8 in a deportation case. A case arguing on the basis of both articles 2 and 3 is 
H.N. v Sweden.
29
 Here the ECtHR entertained, and rejected, the proposition that both 
                                       
21
 Supra note 15 at para 88. 
22
 There is an academic debate whether foreign cases apply the law in an extraterritorial sense. 
Of course the act of the state party (the removal), the requested person and the hearing are all 
intra-territorial. The circumstances that may entail a violation of the Convention, however, are 
in a third country. In Soering the ECtHR stated “The establishment of… responsibility 
inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the 
standards of Article 3 of the Convention”, at para 91. 
23
 Soering, ibid at para 113. It also considered and accepted the applicability of article 13, 
guaranteeing the right to a remedy. 
24
 (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 1. Othman was deported, not extradited. As will be mentioned, recent 
jurisprudence has put an end to any distinction between forms of removal. See further in 
regard to Othman, Michaelsen C., The Renaissance of Non-refoulement? The Othman (Abu 
Qatada) Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, (2012) 61(3) I.C.L.Q. 750. 
25
 (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 12. 
26
 Ibid at para 232.  
27
 (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 3. 
28
 (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 50. 
29
 Application no. 30720/09, 17 December 2012.  
articles would be infringed through Sweden’s deportation of the applicant to Burundi. 
Other articles that have been accepted as arguable in the context of an extradition or 
removal by the ECtHR are article 34 providing the right to individual petition
30
, 
article 4 of Protocol Four prohibiting collective expulsions
31
, article 2 of Protocol 
Four protecting the right to freedom of movement
32
 and article 1 of Protocol Seven 
relating to procedural protections in the course of the expulsion of aliens.
33
     
 
A corollary of the acceptance by the ECtHR of a greater range of human rights as 
arguable in extradition cases has been the development of tests conditioning their 
applicability. Clearly a very remote possibility of, say, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the requesting territory would not be a practically acceptable basis for 
non-extradition. Such a test, generally applied, would lead to the complete 
ineffectiveness of the extradition process. What has happened, and what leads to the 
perception that human rights hinder the extradition process being erroneous, is the 
development of a body of case law defining in quite exact terms the tests that must be 
met for an extradition to be frustrated on the basis of human rights. These cases, 
instead of frustrating extradition, generally emphasise its utility and importance. This 
has been especially the case in regard to qualified human rights, such as that under 
article 8. Therefore, in conjunction with the acceptance of an increasing range of 
rights as arguable by the ECtHR has been the development of tests that must be met 
before a proposed extradition is affected.
34
 In regard to article 3 the test requires the 
requested person to demonstrate the existence of substantial grounds for believing that 
if returned he faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment. The law places the burden upon the requested person to meet the test, 
which encompasses a high threshold. As was noted in Balogun “… in order to violate 
art.3, treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. This applies regardless of 
whether the risk of harm emanates from deliberate acts of state authorities or third 
parties; from a naturally occurring illness; or even from the applicant himself”.35 As 
we will see in Ahmad below the requisite level of severity to successfully engage 
article 3 is indeed high. 
 
A test similar to that applying in regard to article 3 pertains to article 2, protecting the 
right to life. In Kaboulov v Ukraine the ECtHR stated that “… in circumstances where 
there are substantial grounds to believe that the person in question, if extradited, 
would face a real risk of being liable to capital punishment in the receiving country, 
Article 2 implies an obligation not to extradite the individual”.36 In such cases the loss 
of life must be shown to be a near certainty.
37
 The test applicable to article 6 differs 
                                       
30
 Labsi v Slovakia, Application no. 33809/08, 24 September 2012.  
31
 In Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 21. 
32
 Stamose v Bulgaria, Application no. 29713/05, 27 November 2012. 
33
 Takush v Greece, Application no. 2853/09, 17 April 2012.  
34
 “Affected” is the appropriate word as successful arguments do not necessarily lead to non-
extradition. In early cases, such as Soering, they led to assurances that a capital sentence 
would not be imposed. In more recent cases assurances in regard to torture, and torture-
tainted evidence in the context of a criminal trial, have come into play, such as in Othman. 
35
 Supra note 27 at para 31 footnotes omitted.  
36
 (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 39. The case concerned the nature of assurances that capital 
punishment would not be imposed given by Kazakhstan. 
37
 Ullah, supra note 19 at para 24 per Lord Bingham. See also Baker Review, supra note 4, at 
p 132.  
from that applied to articles 2 and 3. It is that the applicant must demonstrate that he 
suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country. 
Othman was the first case where the ECtHR considered more closely the flagrant 
denial test. It inter alia stated in this regard: 
“… that “flagrant denial of justice” is a stringent test of unfairness. A flagrant 
denial of justice goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the 
trial procedures such as might result in a breach of art.6 if occurring within the 
Contracting State itself. What is required is a breach of the principles of fair 
trial guaranteed by art.6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a 
nullification, or destruction of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that 
article”.38 
The Court noted that it had not once found that an extradition or removal would be in 
violation of article 6 since Soering was decided in 1989 – Othman being the first such 
case. Also in Othman the ECtHR iterated the test applying to article 5: 
“… a Contracting State would be in violation of art.5 if it removed an applicant 
to a state where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach of that article. 
However, as with art.6, a high threshold must apply. A flagrant breach of art.5 
would occur only if, for example, the receiving state arbitrarily detained an 
applicant for many years without any intention of bringing him or her to trial. 
A flagrant breach of art.5 might also occur if an applicant would be at risk of 
being imprisoned for a substantial period in the receiving state, having 
previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair trial”.39  
Both articles 6 and 5, then, are conditioned by the same “flagrant denial” test where 
argued by applicants in extradition and removal cases. 
 
The test conditioning article 8 differs from that applying to articles 2, 3, 5, and 6. It is, 
however, similar to the extent that it is difficult to meet. The test is that an extradition 
or removal can only be affected where a person subject to extradition demonstrates 
that the consequences of interference with the his right to private or family life are so 
exceptionally serious so as to outweigh the importance of extradition. This test has 
developed in the course of considerable jurisprudence where article 8 has been argued 
in extradition and removal cases – both in UK courts40 and the ECtHR. In Khan v 
UK
41
 the ECtHR considered an article 8 argument in light of his the applicant’s 
proposed deportation. The reasoning centred upon article 8 being a qualified human 
right and thus legitimately restricted if certain criteria are met. The process of decision 
making entailed firstly judgement upon whether there was, or would be, an 
interference with the applicant’s right to private or family life. If so, then upon 
whether the interference was in accordance with law, necessary in a democratic 
society and in one the stated interests within the article (a legitimate aim such as the 
                                       
38
 Othman, supra note 24 at para 260. Note that subsequent to the ECtHR decision has been 
jurisprudence in English courts concerning, amongst other things, the precise nature of the 
burden in the case. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission has held that on the facts 
of the case the burden rests on the Jordanian prosecution and UK Government, not Othman. 
This has been upheld by the Court of Appeal, in Othman v Secretary of State [2013] EWCA 
(Civ) 277. 
39
 Ibid at para 233.  
40
 Leading UK cases are HH v Italy [2012] UKSC 25, and H v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 
24. See in regard to the latter Arnell, P., Extradition and the Best Interests of Children, (2012) 
(27) Scots Law Times 157. 
41
 Khan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 47.  
prevention of disorder or crime). In Khan the ECtHR noted decision upon “necessary 
in a democratic society” (which entails a proportionality test), involved an assessment 
of various factors such as the seriousness of the offence, the nationalities of the 
concerned persons, the applicant’s family situation etcetera.42 The assessment of 
competing factors is prima facie specific to qualified human rights. As will be seen 
below, however, arguments for the application of a similar assessment to article 3, 
explicitly rejected by the ECtHR, have been accepted in fact. Regardless, it is clear 
that the ECtHR has developed a relatively detailed set of tests conditioning the 
application of human rights to extradition which make it difficult for claimants to 
prevent their extradition on that basis. This fact has led to only relatively few 
arguments against extradition being successful, even in the light of seemingly 
justifiable cases being made out, as in Ahmad. 
 
Ahmad v United Kingdom 
 
Ahmad v United Kingdom
43
 is a conjoined judgment addressing the cases of six 
applicants, Babar Ahmad, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Syed Tahla Ahsan, Mustafa Kamal 
Mustafa (also known as Abu Hamza), Adel Abdul Bary and Khaled Al-Fawaz.
44
 All 
six were sought by the United States on various terrorist-related charges. The 
extradition requests were accompanied by assurances that the death penalty would not 
be sought or carried out, that the trials of the applicants would be before a Federal 
Court and that the accused would not be designated enemy combatants. Whilst each 
applicant’s case differed procedurally, generally similar arguments against extradition 
were put forward by each. These were that the diplomatic notes notwithstanding the 
risk of capital punishment, designation as enemy combatant and extraordinary 
rendition remained and that the possible sentences and “special administrative 
measures” they faced whilst in a federal prison violated human rights.45  
 
The ECtHR judgment in Ahmad firstly laid out the applicable law. The arguments put 
forward by the applicants based on article 3 were distilled to two questions. These 
concerned the conditions of their detention and likely life imprisonment without 
parole and/or extremely long sentences of determinate length if convicted. Prior to 
addressing these, however, the ECtHR discussed the question of a possible UK 
prosecution and whether article 3 was relative in the extradition context. The issue of 
forum arose on account of the applicants arguing that the UK was the appropriate 
place for their prosecution.
46
 It was averred that there were stronger links between 
them and their alleged with the UK than there were with the United States. The first 
and third applicants, for example, highlighted that the link to the United States in their 
cases took the form of a website computer server in Connecticut. In contrast, they 
argued, was considerable UK-based evidence and witnesses. The UK Government 
                                       
42
 Ibid at para 39.  
43
 Supra note 2. Ahmad is in certain respects similar to Edwards v United Kingdom (2012) 
E.H.R.R. 19. These are in regard to life sentences and the relative nature of article 3 in 
extradition cases.  
44
 Ahmad held that the case of the second applicant should be considered separately. It was, 
and Aswat v UK, case 24027/07, was published 16 April 2013. 
45
 The special administrative measures, it was argued, could include solitary confinement and 
the restriction of communications with legal representatives. 
46
 The question of forum is topical once again with section 50 and schedule 20 of the Crimes 
and Courts Act 2013 introducing a new version of a forum bar into UK extradition law. 
noted domestic proceedings were not underway and the applicants could not be tried 
for the “full range and gravamen” of their alleged conduct within it.47 The ECtHR 
agreed and held that in light of the lack of any intention to prosecute within the UK 
the question of the appropriate forum did not arise.  
 
Following deciding the forum point the ECtHR pronounced upon the nature of article 
3 in the extradition context.
 48
 The Court addressed the three distinctions identified as 
existing in Convention jurisprudence by the House of Lords in R (on the application 
of Wellington) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
49
 These were between 
extradition and other forms of removal, between torture and other forms of ill-
treatment and between the minimum level of severity required in the domestic and 
extraterritorial context.
50
 In regard to the first it was held that the question of ill-
treatment cannot hinge on the form of removal.
51
 Concerning the second distinction 
the ECtHR agreed with the majority in the House of Lords that Soering did lend 
support for a distinguishing between torture and other forms of ill-treatment under 
article 3. It went on, however, to hold that subsequent to Soering it had “… normally 
refrained from considering whether the ill-treatment in question should be 
characterised as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.52 A 
reason given for this was the difficulty determining the severity of ill-treatment in 
extradition and other removal cases on account of the exercise being necessarily 
prospective. 
 
Discussion of the purported distinction in the levels of ill-treatment required to engage 
article 3 domestically and extraterritorially entailed analysis of Soering
53
 on the one 
hand and Chahal v UK
54
 and Saadi v Italy
55
 on the other. The ECtHR held that these 
cases should not be interpreted as leaving room for a balancing exercise between the 
risk of ill-treatment and the reasons for expulsion. It held assessment the level of 
severity can only be carried out independently of the reasons for the extradition or 
removal. The ECtHR held, implicitly, that article 3 applied on an absolute basis. It did 
so by providing that the assessment of whether the minimum level of severity has 
been met is to take place independently, and without a balancing exercise. An 
examination of the proportionality of an extradition had not taken place since Soering 
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and so, in this regard, the ECtHR held that it had departed from the approach it then 
contemplated. Article 19 of the Charter was then referred to by the ECtHR as 
confirming the absolute approach. It provides that no one may be removed, expelled 
or extradited where there is a serious risk that he would be subjected to death, torture 
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.   
 
Directly subsequent to its conclusions on the inseparability of torture from other 
forms of ill-treatment and the irrelevance of context in adjudging article 3 the ECtHR 
took a notable and significant volte face. It agreed with Lord Brown (dissenting) in 
Wellington that the absolute nature of article 3 did not mean that any form of ill-
treatment will act as a bar to removal. It noted that it has repeatedly held that 
Convention standards are not to be applied on non-Council of Europe states. It stated 
“This being so, treatment which might violate art. 3 because of an act or omission of a 
contracting state might not attain the minimum legal of severity which is required for 
there to be a violation of art. 3 in an expulsion or extradition case”.56 In other words, 
the level of ill-treatment can vary between state parties and non-state parties. The 
ECtHR listed a number of factors decisive in intra-territorial article 3 cases, such as 
the presence of premeditation and an intention to debase or humiliate the applicant, 
and stated that they “… will not readily be established prospectively in an extradition 
or expulsion context”.57 The ECtHR concluded this point by noting that it has been 
very cautious in finding a removal would be contrary to article 3, especially where the 
requesting state “… had a long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law”.58 
 
The first substantive issue addressed by the ECtHR in Ahmad were the conditions at 
the ADX Florence prison, the likely place of incarceration of the applicants. The 
Court stated that in order for detention to give rise to a violation of article 3 any 
suffering and humiliation must go beyond that arising inevitably through 
incarceration. The ECtHR stated “… account has to be taken of the cumulative effects 
of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant. The 
length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also 
has to be considered”.59 The ECtHR then specifically addressed solitary confinement, 
recreation and outside exercise, and detention and mental health. Whether solitary 
confinement falls within the ambit of article 3, it held, turned upon the conditions, the 
stringency of the measures imposing it, its duration, the objective pursued and its 
effects on the person concerned. It was not per se in violation of article 3, and would 
be compatible in certain circumstances if accompanied by procedural safeguards.
60
 
Recreation and outdoor exercise, the ECtHR held, merited special attention as to its 
availability, duration and attendant conditions. In regard to mental health, the ECtHR 
noted that the detention of persons who are ill may raise issues under article 3, and 
that the provision of appropriate medical care is necessary.
61
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 As noted above the case of the second applicant, Haroon Aswat, was considered separately. 
On 16 April 2013 the ECtHR held that his extradition would entail a breach of article 3. The 
Court stipulated that this was on account of the severity of his mental illness alone.  
The physical environment at ADX Florence, the ECtHR held, did not per se violate 
article 3. An argument that pre-placement procedural safeguards were lacking was 
dismissed. In regard to the restrictive conditions, including lack of human contact, the 
ECtHR held the US authorities would be justified in considering the applicants, if 
convicted, as significant security risks and in imposing limitations upon their 
communications. Although the conditions were highly restrictive, the ECtHR held, 
they do not amount to complete sensory isolation. In-cell stimulation in the form of 
television, books etcetera would exist. The isolation of inmates, the ECtHR held, was 
partial and relative. Significantly, there was a real possibility that applicants could 
gain entry to a “step-down” programme whereby the restrictive nature of their 
conditions would be lessened. Finally, the psychiatric services of the prison were held 
to be adequate in order to address the mental health conditions suffered by the 
applicants. Overall, the conditions at ADX Florence for all bar the second applicant 
were held not to violate article 3.  
 
The possible sentences imposed on the applicants were then addressed. The ECtHR 
acted upon the assumption that the applicants would face the maximum possible 
sentence if convicted (a discretionary life sentence). It held that that sentence was not 
grossly disproportionate in light of the terrorist-related charges they faced. The fact 
that imprisonment was necessarily prospective led to a decision on whether a 
legitimate penological purpose was served by its continuation being unanswerable. 
However it was clear, the ECtHR held, that the sentences that could be imposed were 
reducible. The first, third, fourth and sixth applicants, therefore, had not demonstrated 
a real risk of treatment reaching the threshold of article 3. The fifth applicant, Adel 
Abdul Bary, was considered separately because he faced a greater possible 
punishment, that being multiple sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole. The ECtHR held that in the absence of evidence of exceptional 
circumstances a sentence of life imprisonment without parole was not grossly 
disproportionate. There would be no violation of article 3 if he was extradited.
62
  
 
The European Arrest Warrant 
 
The Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, creating and governing European Arrest 
Warrants
63
, is given effect by Part 1 of the 2003 Act. The Framework Decision creates 
a system of surrender of persons on the basis of the mutual recognition of arrest 
warrants issued by Member States. The operation of the EAW within the UK has 
given rise to a large number of cases addressing arguments made on the basis of 
human rights. The Framework Decision itself, however, does not require that 
executing territories consider them.
64
 Human rights were not contemplated as a basis 
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 Article 1(3) provides that the Framework Decision shall not modify the obligation to 
respect human rights in article 6 of the TEU. Recital 12 provides that the Framework 
Decision respects fundamental rights. Finally, Recital 13 provides bars removal where there is 
for refusal to act pursuant to a EAW.
65
 As seen above however, the 2003 Act 
explicitly provides that surrender under a EAW must not contravene human rights. In 
UK law the Human Rights Act 1998 and, through it, the Convention have applied to 
the EAW since its inception.  
 
The Convention has not only applied to the EAW in UK law as a result of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. It has applied on account of human rights being held by the ECJ to 
be a part of EU law. As is well known, in response to constitutional demands by 
Germany and Italy, in the first instance at least, the ECJ adopted human rights as 
general principles.
66
 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009, however, human rights can be considered to have entered a new period. This 
follows the Treaty giving legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
67
 The role 
of the Convention has also been given explicit recognition.
68
  
 
The development of human rights in EU law is important in extradition terms both 
specifically and generally – although the effect to date in practice of this development 
has been minimal. Specifically, article 19(2) of the Charter provides “No one may be 
removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she 
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment”. As seen, this accords with the position in ECtHR 
jurisprudence – the relativist discussion above noted. Generally, explicit EU human 
rights law in the form of the Charter now applies to the EAW. It is not settled, 
however, whether human rights law within the EU has been changed by this 
development or, instead, has been merely been clarified or regularised. Articles 51 
and 52 of the Charter, entitled Field of Application and Scope and Interpretation of 
Rights and Principles respectively, support the view that the Charter is affirmative not 
additional.
69
 The Baker Review stated on this point “… as a matter of domestic law 
the precise meaning and effect of the Charter is unclear. It appears from the Preamble 
that the purpose of the Charter was not to create a new and distinct body of rights: it 
was intended to make the fundamental rights already protected within the European 
Union ‘more visible’. If this view is correct, the Charter does not alter the nature of 
the obligations already imposed on Member States under European Union law”.70 
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mirrored in article 19 of the Charter, noted below.  
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Radu – the Advocate General’s Opinion 
 
Radu, a Romanian national, was the subject of four EAWs issued by Germany. He 
opposed his extradition in the Romanian courts, largely on human rights grounds. 
Radu’s arguments, as interpreted, were put to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Both 
the Opinion of the Advocate General and the decision of the Grand Chamber are 
notable – although, of course, the Opinion has no legal force. The questions put to the 
ECJ were construed by the Advocate General as concerning three issues. These were 
the possible impact upon the Framework Decision of the Charter, the nature of the 
light to liberty in the requested state under the Charter, Convention and the 
Framework Decision, and whether the Framework Decision permitted the refusal to 
execute a warrant where the rights to liberty, fair trial and the presumption of 
innocence and right to a defence are violated in the requesting state. In addressing 
these questions Advocate General Sharpston stated articles 6, 48 and 52 of the 
Charter, relating to the right to liberty, presumption of innocence and right to a 
defence and scope of the Charter respectively, form part of the primary law of the 
Union. Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, protecting the liberty of the person and 
right to a fair trial, constituted general principles. In regard to the right to liberty in the 
requested state the Advocate General confirmed it was engaged under the Charter and 
Convention when executing an EAW. She stated proceedings must take place with 
due diligence and the detention must be lawful and not arbitrary.  
 
The question of whether the Romanian court could refuse to execute a EAW where it 
would infringe, or risk infringing, the requested persons human rights under articles 6, 
48 and 52 of the Charter and articles 5 and 6 of the Convention was perhaps the most 
important of those posed. As noted, the focus of this argument were the circumstances 
in Germany and the issuance of the EAW there. The Advocate General stated that, 
prima facie, the answer was no. Human rights considerations cannot act as a ground 
for non-execution of an EAW. The grounds for refusing execution were listed in the 
Framework Decision, she noted, and they did not include the human rights of the 
requested person. Indeed, the grounds had been held to be exhaustive.
72
 The purposes 
behind the Framework Decision were said to militate against a positive answer to the 
question.  
 
Following adumbrating the factors supporting the position that human rights 
considerations cannot act as a basis for non-execution the Advocate General notably 
concluded otherwise. She stated that she did not believe that “… a narrow approach – 
which would exclude human rights considerations altogether – is supported either by 
the Framework Decision or by the case law”.73 Referring to article 1(3) of the 
Framework Decision she said “In my view, it is clear that the judicial authorities of an 
executing Member State are bound to have regard to the fundamental rights set out in 
the Convention and Charter when considering whether to execute a European arrest 
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warrant”.74 This is, in EU law, a significant and novel point. It is one, if followed and 
interpreted liberally could act to materially affect the operation of the EAW system.
75
 
 
Radu – the Grand Chamber’s Judgment 
 
The Grand Chamber’s decision in Radu stands in stark contrast to that of the Opinion 
of the Advocate General. It is, in comparison, summary and dismissive. The questions 
put to it were condensed to the single question of whether the Romanian court “… is 
entitled to examine whether the issue of a European arrest warrant complies with 
fundamental rights with a view, if that is not the case, to refusing execution even if 
that ground of non-execution is provided for in neither the Framework Decision 
2002/584 nor in the national legislation which transposed that decision”.76 In other 
words, the Grand Chamber noted, Radu claimed “… that the provisions of Framework 
Decision 2002/584 deprive the Romanian executing authorities of the possibility of 
ascertaining whether the rights to a fair trial, to the presumption of innocence and to 
liberty which he derives from the Charter and the ECHR have been observed, where 
the contested European arrest warrants were issued without his having been 
summoned or having the possibility of hiring a lawyer or presenting his defence”.77 
As noted above, it was not the proceedings of the executing authorities in Romania 
nor the prospective criminal trial in Germany itself that were the focus of Radu’s 
argument but rather the actions of the EAW issuing authority in Germany. His 
argument relied upon the rights to liberty, a fair trial, a remedy, the presumption of 
innocence and the right to a defence.
78
 In essence, the ECJ was faced with deciding 
whether it is possible for the executing judicial authorities to refuse to execute an 
EAW where the issuing authorities did not hear the requested person before the arrest 
warrant was issued.  
 
Addressing the question as it defined it the ECJ firstly noted that the right to be heard 
is guaranteed by article 6 of the Convention and by articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. 
It then referred to the purpose of the Framework Decision, that being the replacement 
of the system of extradition with a system of surrender based upon the principle of 
mutual recognition. The new system sought to facilitate accelerated judicial co-
operation based upon the high degree of confidence which should exist between 
Member States. Accordingly, the Court noted, article 1(2) of the Framework Decision 
obliges Member states to act upon receiving an EAW – with limited and explicit 
exceptions. These are mandatory exceptions governed by article 3 and optional 
exceptions under articles 4 and 4a. The ECJ noted that the issuance of an EAW 
without the requested person being heard was not a ground for non-execution of a 
warrant. Indeed, it stated such a ground for non-execution would “... inevitably lead to 
the failure of the very system of surrender... in so far as such an arrest warrant must 
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have a certain element of surprise, in particular to stop the person concerned from 
taking flight”.79 Further, the right to be heard will be observed in the executing 
Member State, the Court observed. It then concluded that executing judicial 
authorities cannot refuse to execute a warrant on the ground that the requested person 
was not heard in the issuing Member State before the arrest warrant was issued. The 
relatively abstract and general discussion found in the Advocate General’s Opinion 
was, in the ECJ judgment, wholly absent. 
 
Analysis  
 
The human rights law under the Convention and Charter as applied to extradition has 
been described above. It clearly demonstrates that the popular perception that human 
rights law acts to the detriment of extradition and international criminal justice is a 
fallacy. The ECtHR has developed tests to be applied to the operation of human rights 
law in the extradition and removal context. These have, to date, been adopted by the 
ECJ. Although the tests vary, in some cases necessarily so on account of the 
entitlement in question, all are difficult to meet – they entail a high threshold. 
Adjectives attached to them include “stringent”, “flagrant”, “substantial” and 
“serious”. Further, the onus is on the applicant to meet the test to the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard. As was seen in Ahmad human rights will not act as a 
barrier to extradition even in the face of life imprisonment without parole and very 
restrictive conditions of detention. It was not until 2012 and Othman that article 6 of 
the Convention was successfully invoked – a fact illustrating the exceptional nature of 
such cases. In Radu the Grand Chamber was dismissive of the notion that the Charter 
could be invoked as a ground of non-execution of a EAW – although the Advocate 
General’s Opinion perhaps presages otherwise in the future. Of course human rights 
are often put forward in UK EAW cases, as well as non-EU Part 2 cases. The former 
are the result of the operation of section 21 of the 2003 Act, not the Framework 
Decision or the Charter. The latter come under section 87 of the 2003 Act. The vast 
majority of the considerable volume of cases heard in UK courts, applying the tests 
and burden as developed, are unsuccessful. Contributing to the public perception are 
not successful human rights arguments but rather the sheer number of cases arising 
and the publicity attendant to the rare successful instances.  
 
A second point to note is that the entry into force of the Charter has not had an impact 
upon the operation of the EAW in EU law in the form of preventing surrenders. As 
the law stands, there is similarity between the human rights-related extradition law 
under the Convention and the Charter. The ECJ in Radu, to the extent that it referred 
to human rights at all, did so in conformity with the law as developed by the ECtHR. 
As noted, though, the Advocate General in Radu suggested otherwise. She relied upon 
article 1(3) of the Framework Decision, amongst other authorities, as the basis for 
suggesting that human rights could be a basis for the non-execution of a EAW. She 
also “took issue” with the extant tests and burden of proof. In regard to the right to a 
fair trial she suggested a test to the effect that the deficiency or deficiencies identified 
should be such to fundamentally destroy a trial’s fairness. Were this test adopted by 
the ECJ there would be necessarily a divergence in law between article 47 of the 
Charter and article 6 of the Convention. This would prima facie be at odds with the 
conception of the Charter merely affirming existing legal protections. However, 
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article 52(3) of the Charter does permit a divergence, providing “In so far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope 
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection”. That 
noted, it is not unreasonable to foresee arguments based upon the prohibition on 
discrimination in article 21 of the Charter and article 14 of the Convention arising 
were this to happen.
80
 As seen, though, as the law stands this development is wholly 
hypothetical. 
 
The third point to make is that the ECtHR has accepted, in practice, a relativist 
approach to the application of fundamental human rights in an extradition context.
81
 
This is evident in Ahmad. It will be recalled that after rejecting the suggestion that the 
protection under article 3 could hinge on whether the purported violation occurred 
within or outwith the Council of Europe it largely accepted just that. The ECtHR held 
that not all forms of ill-treatment will act as a bar to removal. The crucial passage 
provided “… treatment which might violate art. 3 because of an act or omission of a 
contracting state might not attain the minimum legal of severity which is required for 
there to be a violation of art. 3 in an expulsion or extradition case”.82 The ECtHR up 
to this point had in Ahmad “… forcefully rejected the relativist approach proposed by 
the UK Government, favouring instead an absolute prohibition on any removal which 
potentially violates article 3”.83 Clearly the law on this point is opaque. As the ECtHR 
demonstrated, its case law subsequent to Soering established that article 3 protection 
is absolute, regardless of the form or ill-treatment and its place of past or future 
commission. Whilst emphasising that Soering on this point is no longer good law, it 
went on to follow it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Extradition and human rights make odd bedfellows. They pull in different directions – 
one in pursuit of efficient and effective international criminal justice and the other 
seeking to protect individuals from egregious state action. The resultant difficulties 
are seemingly exacerbated by the involvement of third states, international and EU 
law, and, perhaps, a degree of national chauvinism. The development of an area of 
security, freedom and justice by the EU raises specific and contradictory pressures. 
The accession of the EU to the Convention does likewise. A solution that completely 
addresses the tensions and pressures arising through extradition is not possible. 
Instead the law must balance the opposing aims of efficient international criminal 
justice (within and outwith the EU) and the entitlements of those subjected to it. As is 
clear from the above, the law has been attempting to do just that.  
 
Consideration of the (numerous) conflicts arising when human rights are argued in 
extradition cases by courts, national or European, takes time – and makes headlines. A 
perception that has arisen in the UK is that human rights act to the detriment of 
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extradition and reasonably efficient international and European criminal justice. This 
is just not the case. The apparent issues and problems arising in extradition law in fact 
do not concern human rights issues
84
 directly. Rather it is the sheer scale of cases 
arising and the time required to consider them appropriately which are the basis of 
legitimate concern. The particular prosecution policies of certain of the UK’s 
extradition partners, in particular that of Poland, has engendered a very considerable 
case-load and burden on UK courts. Human rights are correctly considered in the 
context of extradition. No state should knowingly be complicit in a violation of 
human rights through extradition. The ECtHR and EJC, however, face uncomfortable 
decisions. Ahmad illustrates the difficulties facing the principle of absolutism in 
human rights protection. Belying popular belief, the ECtHR has distinguished 
between forms of ill-treatment on the basis of geography. It professed absolutism and 
decided otherwise. Human rights, only very exceptionally, prevent the extradition pf 
requested persons.  
                                       
84
 Assuming that extradition may affect human rights only detrimentally is misplaced. The 
Baker Review notes that the “… effective operation of the European arrest warrant system is 
likely to bring in its wake improvements in the administration of justice [and] contribute to 
more effective compliance with the reasonable time requirement contained in Article 6 of the 
Human Rights Convention”. 
